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Abstract
We study the secrecy capacity in the vicinity of colluding eavesdroppers. Contrary to the perfect
collusion assumption in previous works, our new information-theoretic model considers constraints in
collusion. We derive the achievable secure rates (lower bounds on the perfect secrecy capacity), both for
the discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels. We also compare the proposed rates to the non-colluding
and perfect colluding cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner [1] introduced the information-theoretic model for confidentiality in noisy communications,
called wiretap channel, where a legitimate transmitter wishes to transmit a confidential message to a
legitimate receiver while keeping it hidden from an eavesdropper (wiretapper). The eavesdropper is
assumed to have unlimited computation power, know the coding scheme of the legitimate user, and it
only listens to the channel. When the channel to the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the channel to
the legitimate receiver, Wyner [1] proposed the secrecy capacity achieving scheme, known also as Wyner’s
wiretap channel coding, which constitutes of multicoding and randomized encoding [2, Section 22.1.1].
This result is extended to the broadcast channel with confidential message and to the general wiretap
channel (not necessarily degraded) by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3].
Recently, different legitimate-wiretapper user combinations were studied [4]–[8]. In this line of works,
scenarios with multiple eavesdroppers considered only non-colluding ones. This implies that information
2leakage of a certain message to all eavesdropper is computed as the maximum of the leakage to each of
them. In some applications, this assumption may underestimate the eavesdroppers’ power: eavesdroppers
can collude, i.e., share their channel outputs (observations), and make the attack more effective [9]. Hence,
combating colluding eavesdroppers, especially in wireless networks, has been a significant challenge [9]–
[14]. To the best of our knowledge, all previous works modeled k colluding eavesdroppers as one
eavesdropper with k antennas; we term this perfect colluding eavesdroppers. Using the equivalent Single-
Input Multiple-Output (SIMO) Gaussian wiretap channel, the information leakage is determined by the
aggregate Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) of all eavesdroppers; compared to the maximum SNR in the
non-colluding case [9]. This assumption significantly overestimates eavesdropping capability, forcing a
legitimate user to increase its power linearly with the number of eavesdroppers to achieve a positive
secure rate. However, collusion (esp. in the wireless networks) necessitates communication resources
and power consumption. This, in fact, restricts the collusion channel capacity and thus improves the
achievable secure rate by the legitimate user. Hence, here the problem is to find an appropriate model
and to analyze the effect of these constraints on the secrecy capacity based on this model.
A. Our Contributions
In this paper, we consider the potential constraints in collusion, by modeling constrained collusion with
an equivalent wiretap channel, called Wiretap Channel with Constrained Colluding Eavesdroppers (WTC-
CCE). For our general WTC-CCE, we assume that colluding eavesdroppers communicate (by defining
their channel inputs) over a virtual collusion channel, in addition to the main channel. The higher the
collusion channel capacity, the more leaked information can be exchanged. Our model captures previously
studied models as special cases: non-colluding with zero collusion rates and perfect collusion with infinite
collusion rates. We also propose a special case, the orthogonal WTC-CCE: the collusion channel is
orthogonal to the main one (unlike the general WTC-CCE where eavesdroppers shares the same channel
with the legitimate transmitter). First, we derive an achievable secure rate (a lower bound on the perfect
secrecy capacity) for the general discrete memoryless WTC-CCE. The idea is to let the eavesdroppers
do their best in colluding. Hence, the information leakage rate is derived by considering the outer bound
on the capacity region of the collusion channel; this resembles the cut-set upper bound for the relay
channel [2]. Next, we extend our result to the general Gaussian WTC-CCE and its orthogonal version.
The main difference is that in the general model, the eavesdroppers may use jamming techniques to
confuse the legitimate receiver but they could be exposed to the legitimate user. In the orthogonal model,
beyond increased required resources, the eavesdroppers may loose some information leakage rate due to
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Fig. 1. General Wiretap Channel with Constrained Colluding Eavesdroppers (WTC-CCE).
not sending jamming signals. However, the orthogonality may serve eavesdroppers in hiding themselves.
We provide numerical examples to analyze the achievable secure rate and evaluate the overestimation
amount (by comparing to perfect colluding case) in different scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the channel model and the notations.
In Section III, our main results for the general discrete-memoryless channel are presented, while in
Section IV, the Gaussian channel results are stated. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Upper-case letters (e.g., X) denote Random Variables (RVs) and lower-case letters (e.g., x) their
realizations. The probability mass function (p.m.f) of a RV X with alphabet set X is denoted by pX(x);
occasionally, the subscript X is omitted. Xji indicates a sequence of RVs (Xi,Xi+1, ...,Xj); we use Xj
instead of Xj1 for brevity. N (0, σ2) denotes a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with variance σ2.
Consider the WTC-CCE in Fig. 1: a four terminal discrete channel (one transmitter, one legitimate
receiver and two eavesdroppers), denoted by (Xl×X1e×X2e, p(ynl , yn1e, yn2e|xnl , xn1e, xn2e),Yl×Y1e×Y1e).
Xl ∈ Xl and Xje ∈ Xje are the channel inputs of the legitimate transmitter and eavesdropper j and
Yl ∈ Yl and Yje ∈ Yje are the channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper j, for
j ∈ {1, 2}. p(ynl , yn1e, yn2e|xnl , xn1e, xn2e) is the channel transition probability distribution. We also assume
that the channel is memoryless. In n channel uses, the legitimate transmitter desires to send the message
M to the legitimate receiver using the following code.
Definition 1: A (2nR, n, P (n)e ) code for WTC-CCE consists of:
(i) A message set M = [1 : 2nR], where m is uniformly distributed over M.
(ii) A randomized encoding function, fn, at the legitimate transmitter that maps a message m to a
codeword xnl ∈ X nl .
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Fig. 2. Orthogonal WTC-CCE.
(iii) Two sets of encoding functions at the eavesdroppers: {fje,t}nt=1 : Rt−1 −→ R such that xje,t =
fje,t(y
t−1
je ), for j ∈ {1, 2} and 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
(iv) A decoding function at the legitimate receiver g : Ynl 7→ M.
(v) Probability of error for this code is defined as:
P (n)e =
1
2nR
∑
m∈M
Pr(g(ynl ) 6= m|m sent). (1)
(vi) The information leakage rate at eavesdropper j ∈ {1, 2} is defined as:
R
(n)
L,j =
1
n
I(M ;Y nje). (2)
All codewords are revealed to the eavesdroppers. However, eavesdroppers’ mapping are not known to
the legitimate user.
Remark 1: The mutual information term in (2) is same as the non-colluding case, compared to
I(M ;Y n1e, Y
n
2e) in the perfect colluding scenario. The difference here comes from the channel distribution
and the fact that Y n1e and Y n1e given Xl are not independent (due to X1e and X2e).
Definition 2: A rate-leakage tuple (R,RL,1, RL,2) is achievable if there exists a sequence of (2nR, n, P (n)e )
codes such that P (n)e → 0 as n → ∞ and lim sup
n→∞
R
(n)
L,j ≤ RL,j for j ∈ {1, 2}. The secrecy capacity
Cs is the supremum of all achievable rates R such that perfect secrecy is achieved, i.e., RL,j = 0 for
j ∈ {1, 2}.
Motivated by the fact that the eavesdroppers prefer to avoid exposure, we also consider a special case
of the WTC-CCE. We assume that the collusion channel (used by the eavesdroppers) is decoupled from
the main channel and consider the orthogonal WTC-CCE in Fig. 2. Here, Yje = (Y mje , Y cje) for j ∈ {1, 2}
and p(yl, y1e, y2e|xl, x1e, x2e) = p(yl, ym1e, ym2e|xl)p(yc1e, yc2e|x1e, x2e), where the variables related to the
main and the collusion channels are indicated with the superscripts m and c, respectively. Substituting
X1e = X2e = ∅ results in the non-colluding case; Y c1e = Y m2e , Y c2e = Y m1e results in the perfect colluding
case. To simplify notation let j¯ be the complement of j in {1, 2}. Now, consider the general Gaussian
5WTC-CCE at time t = 1, . . . , n for j ∈ {1, 2}, modeled as:
Yl,t = hlXl,t + h
l
1eX1e,t + h
l
2eX2e,t + Zl,t
Yje,t = h
je
l Xl,t + h
je
j¯e
Xj¯e,t + Zje,t (3)
where hki is a known channel gain from transmitter i to receiver k. We assume perfect echo cancellation
at eavesdroppers (h1e1e = h2e2e = 0). Xu,t is an input signal with average power constraint
1
n
n∑
t=1
|xu,t|2 ≤ Pu (4)
and Zu,t is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) zero-mean Gaussian noise component with
power Nu, for u ∈ {l, 1e, 2e}. In practice, hl1e and hl2e may be small. The Gaussian counterpart of
orthogonal WTC-CCE for j ∈ {1, 2} can be shown as:
Yl,t = hlXl,t + Zl,t (5)
Y mje,t = hjmXl,t + Z
m
je,t , Y
c
je,t = hjcXj¯e,t + Z
c
je,t
where hjm and hjc are known channel gains received at eavesdropper j from the main channel and the
collusion channel, respectively; power constraints of Pl, P1e, P2e apply for input signals; Zmje,t and Zcje,t
are i.i.d zero-mean Gaussian noise components with powers Nmje and N cje at eavesdropper j from the
main channel and the collusion channel, respectively.
III. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS CHANNEL
Our first result establishes an achievable secure rate for the general discrete memoryless WTC-CCE.
Theorem 1: For the general discrete memoryless WTC-CCE, the secrecy capacity is lower-bounded
by:
RDMs = sup inf I(Xl;Yl)−min{I(Xl;Y1e, Y2e|X1e,X2e),
max{I(Xl,X1e,X2e;Y1e), I(Xl,X1e,X2e;Y2e)}} (6)
where the supremum and infimum are taken over all joint p.m.fs of the form p(xl|x1e, x2e)p(yl, y1e, y2e|xl,
x1e, x2e) and p(x1e, x2e), respectively.
Proof: The proof is based on the random coding scheme, which uses Wyner wiretap coding at the
legitimate user. At the eavesdroppers, the idea is to let them do their best in colluding. Hence, the coding
strategy of the eavesdroppers is not determined in the scheme. As a result, the information leakage rate
6is derived by considering the outer bound on the capacity region of the collusion channel and looks like
the cut-set upper bound for the relay channel [2].
Codebook Generation: Generate 2n(R+Rs) i.i.d xnl sequences, each with probability
n∏
t=1
p(xl,t). Index
them as xnl (m, s) where m ∈ [1 : 2nR] and s ∈ [1 : 2nRs ].
Encoding: To send message m ∈ [1 : 2nR], the stochastic encoder at the legitimate transmitter uniformly
randomly chooses s and transmits xnl (m, s).
Decoding: The decoder at the legitimate receiver wants to correctly recover m, s and seeks a unique
message m˜ and some s˜ such that (xnl (m˜, s˜), ynl ) are jointly typical. Applying the packing lemma [2],
with arbitrary high probability m˜ = m, if n is large enough and
R+Rs≤I(Xl;Yl). (7)
Analysis of information leakage rate: To simplify the notation, let Xe = (X1e,X2e) and Ye =
(Y1e, Y2e). We derive two bounds for the randomness index rate, Rs. First, we obtain the second term of in-
formation leakage rates in the min term in (6), i.e., RL2 = max{I(Xl,X1e,X2e;Y1e), I(Xl,X1e,X2e;Y2e)}.
Now, consider the leakaged information to Y n1e averaged over the random codebook C.
I(M ;Y n1e|C)=H(M |C) −H(M |Y n1e, C)
=nR−H(M,Y n1e,Xnl ,Xne |C) +H(Xnl ,Xne |M,Y n1e, C) +H(Y n1e|C)
=nR−H(Xnl ,Xne |C)−H(M,Y n1e|Xnl ,Xne , C) +H(Xnl ,Xne |M,Y n1e, C) +H(Y n1e|C)
≤nR−H(Xnl |C)−H(Y n1e|Xnl ,Xne , C) +H(Xnl ,Xne |M,Y n1e, C) +H(Y n1e|C)
=nR− n(R+Rs) + I(Xnl ,Xne ;Y n1e|C) +H(Xnl ,Xne |M,Y n1e, C)
(a)
≤−nRs + nI(Xl,Xe;Y1e) +H(Xnl ,Xne |M,Y n1e, C)
(b)
≤ nδ1
(a) holds since the channel is memoryless; (b) follows by using [2, Lemma 22.1]: if Rs ≥ I(Xl,X1e,X2e;Y1e),
then H(Xnl ,Xn1e,Xn2e|M,Y n1e, C) ≤ nRs−nI(Xl,X1e,X2e;Y1e)+nδ1. Following similar steps, one can
show that if Rs ≥ I(Xl,X1e,X2e;Y2e), then I(M ;Y n2e|C) ≤ δ2. Considering (2), combining (7) and
these constraints on Rs gives RDMs with RL2.
Now, to derive the first term of information leakage rates in min in (6), i.e., RL1 = I(Xl;Y1e, Y2e|X1e,X2e),
and evaluate the leakaged information to both Y n1e and Y n2e, averaged over the random codebook C.
I(M ;Y ne |C)=H(M |C) −H(M |Y ne , C)
=nR−H(M,Y ne ,Xnl |C) +H(Xnl |M,Y ne , C) +H(Y ne |C)
7(a)
=nR−H(Xnl |C)−H(M,Y ne |Xnl , C) +H(Xnl |M,Y ne ,Xne , C) +H(Y ne |C)
(b)
≤nR− n(R+Rs) + I(Xnl ;Y ne |C) +H(Xnl |M,Y ne ,Xne , C)
(c)
=−nRs +
n∑
i=1
I(Xnl ;Ye,i|Y i−1e ,Xe,i, C) +H(Xnl |M,Y ne ,Xne , C)
(d)
≤−nRs + nI(Xl;Ye|Xe) +H(Xnl |M,Y ne ,Xne , C)
(e)
≤ nδ3 (8)
(a) and (c) follow since xje,t = fje,t(yt−1je ), for j ∈ {1, 2} and 1 ≤ t ≤ n; (b) is due to the fact that condi-
tioning does not increase the entropy; (d) holds due to the memoryless property of the channel; (e) follows
by using [2, Lemma 22.1]: if Rs ≥ I(Xl;Y1e, Y2e|X1e,X2e), then H(Xnl |M,Y n1e, Y n2e,Xn1e,Xn2e, C) ≤
nRs−nI(Xl;Y1e, Y2e|X1e,X2e)+nδ3. Note that (8) implies the individual leakage rates as I(M ;Y nje|C)≤nδ3
for j ∈ {1, 2}. Now, combining (7) and this contraint on Rs gives RDMs with RL1. This completes the
proof.
Remark 2: Substituting Yje = (Y mje , Y cje) for j ∈ {1, 2} in (6) results in an achievable secure rate
(RODMs ) for the orthogonal discrete memoryless WTC-CCE, where the supremum is taken over all joint
p.m.fs of the form p(xl|x1e, x2e)p(yl, ym1e, ym2e|xl)p(yc1e, yc2e|x1e, x2e).
Remark 3: By setting X1e = X2e = ∅ in (6),RDMs reduces to sup I(Xl;Yl)−max{I(Xl;Y1e), I(Xl;Y2e)}
for the non-colluding case. Furthermore, redefining Y c1e = Y m2e , Y c2e = Y m1e in RODMs results in the
achievable secure rate for the perfect colluding case, i.e., sup I(Xl;Yl)− I(Xl;Y1e, Y2e).
IV. GAUSSIAN CHANNEL
We study the Gaussian WTC-CCE. First, we consider the orthogonal Gaussian WTC-CCE. Let θ(x) .=
1
2 log(1 + x).
Theorem 2: The following is an achievable secure rate for orthogonal Gaussian WTC-CCE (defined
in (5)).
ROGs = θ(
h2l Pl
Nl
)−min
{
θ(Pl(
h21m
Nm1e
+
h22m
Nm2e
)), (9)
max{θ(h
2
1mPl
Nm1e
+
h21cP2e
N c1e
+
h21mh
2
1cPlP2e
N c1eN
m
1e
), θ(
h22mPl
Nm2e
+
h22cP1e
N c2e
+
h22mh
2
2cPlP1e
N c2eN
m
2e
)}
}
.
Proof: We can extend the achievable secrecy rate in Theorem 1 (after applying Remark 2) to the
Gaussian case with continuous alphabets with standard arguments [15]. As we do not know the optimal
distribution p(xl|x1e, x2e) that maximizes RODMs , we use a Gaussian input distribution (at the legitimate
transmitter) to achieve a lower bound. Let Xl ∼ N (0, Pl). Note that the leakage rates in RODMs (i.e.,
8RL1 and RL2) are Multiple Access Channel (MAC) type bounds. From the maximum-entropy theorem
[15] (or [2, P. 21]), these bounds are largest (or equivalently RODMs in minimized over p(x1e, x2e))
for the Gaussian inputs at the eavesdroppers. Hence, set Xje ∼ N (0, Pje) for j ∈ {1, 2} and define
−1 ≤ ρj ≤ 1 as the correlation coefficient between Xje and Xl, i.e., E(XjeXl) = ρj
√
PjePl for
j ∈ {1, 2} and ρ12 = E(X1eX2e)√P1eP2e . After, calculating the mutual information terms in (6), one can easily
show that the leakage rate is maximized (or secure rate in minimized) for ρ12 = ρ1 = ρ2 = 0. This means
that in the orthogonal setup, the best strategy for the eavesdroppers is using the independent codewords.
This achieves ROGs in (9).
Remark 4: To achieve the non-colluding rate, i.e., θ(h
2
l
Pl
Nl
)−max{θ(h21mPl
Nm
1e
), θ(h
2
2m
Pl
Nm
2e
)}, set P1e = P2e =
0 in ROGs . Moreover, it is enough to set P1e, P2e → ∞ in ROGs to derive the perfect colluding rate:
θ(h
2
l
Pl
Nl
)− θ(Pl(h
2
1m
Nm
1e
+ h
2
2m
Nm
2e
)).
In the following, we obtain a secure rate for the general Gaussian WTC-CCE. The proof is similar to
Theorem 2.
Theorem 3: The following is an achievable secure rate for Gaussian WTC-CCE (in (3)).
RGs = min
ρ1,ρ2,ρ12
θ(
h2l Pl + ρ
2
1(h
l
1e)
2P1e + ρ
2
2(h
l
2e)
2P2e + 2hlh
l
1eρ1
√
PlP1e + 2hlh
l
2eρ2
√
PlP2e
(hl1e)
2P1e(1− ρ21) + (hl2e)2P2e(1− ρ22) + 2hl1ehl2eρ12
√
P1eP2e +Nl
) (10)
−min
{
max{A(1), A(2)}, θ(Pl(1− ρ
2
1P
2
1e + ρ
2
2P
2
2e + 2ρ1ρ2ρ12P1eP2e
P1eP2e(1− ρ212)
)(
(h1el )
2
N1e
+
(h2el )
2
N2e
))
}
.
where for j ∈ {1, 2}:
A(j) = θ
(
(hjel )
2Pl + (h
je
j¯e
)2Pj¯e + 2h
je
l h
je
j¯e
ρ2
√
PlPj¯e
Nje
)
.
Remark 5: Channel gains hl1e and hl2e make the jamming possible for the eavesdroppers. However,
they also increase the probability of exposure. In order to compare the two strategies (through numerical
examples), we define the non-jamming rate RNJGs by setting hl1e = hl2e = 0 in RGs . In addition, by setting
P1e, P2e →∞ in RGs , the secure rate is zero, which is less than (or equal to) the perfect colluding rate.
This is due to the jamming possibility and is achieved by ρ12 = ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.
Fig. 3 compares the secure rates for the Gaussian WTC-CCE, i.e., RGs ,ROGs ,RNJGs , to the non-
colluding and perfect colluding scenarios in two different collusion channel conditions. It can be seen
that the perfect colluding assumption significantly overestimates the eavesdroppers. Recall that the WTC-
CCE rates consider the best possible strategy for the eavesdroppers; which may not be achievable for
them. Thus, even the constrained colluding rates consider the worst case scenarios for the eavesdroppers’
ability to collude.
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In Fig. 3a (weak collusion channel), using the orthogonal collusion channel for eavesdroppers is worse
than using the non-orthogonal one (because ROGs ≥ RNJGs ). In fact, with weak direct collusion links,
eavesdroppers may benefit of the main channel by relaying (transmitting correlated codewords). Hence,
the optimal ρ1, ρ2 for RNJGs are not zero; while they are zero for ROGs . However, for improved collusion
channel (in Fig. 3b), using an orthogonal collusion channel is better (from the eavesdroppers point of view)
if one cannot use jamming (or does not want to use jamming to avoid exposure), i.e., ROGs ≤ RNJGs . To
evaluate the general rate RGs , one should note the effect of jamming in addition to collusion, which even
enables the eavesdroppers (or now jammers) to make the secure rate zero for some range of legitimate
power Pl.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed WTC-CCE, a wiretap-based channel model to capture collusion constraints and derived
the achievable secure rates. Our results showed that indeed the perfect collusion model overestimates
the eavesdroppers if they choose to be unexposed. With no exposure constraint, they can jam to further
reduce the secure rate in some cases.
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